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Unconditionally secure non-relativistic bit commitment is known to be impossible in both the
classical and the quantum world. However, when committing to a string of n bits at once, how far
can we stretch the quantum limits? In this letter, we introduce a framework of quantum schemes
where Alice commits a string of n bits to Bob, in such a way that she can only cheat on a bits
and Bob can learn at most b bits of information before the reveal phase. Our results are two-fold:
we show by an explicit construction that in the traditional approach, where the reveal and guess
probabilities form the security criteria, no good schemes can exist: a + b is at least n. If, however,
we use a more liberal criterion of security, the accessible information, we construct schemes where
a = 4 log
2
n + O(1) and b = 4, which is impossible classically. Our findings significantly extend
known no-go results for quantum bit commitment.
PACS numbers:
Imagine two mutually distrustful parties Alice and Bob
at distant locations. They can only communicate over a
channel, but want to play the following game: Alice se-
cretly chooses a bit x. Bob wants to be sure that Alice
indeed has made her choice. Yet, Alice wants to keep x
hidden from Bob until she decides to reveal x. To con-
vince Bob that she made up her mind, Alice sends Bob a
commitment. From the commitment alone, Bob cannot
deduce x. At a later time, Alice reveals x and enables
Bob to open the commitment. Bob can now check if Alice
is telling the truth. This scenario is known as bit commit-
ment. Commitments play a central role in modern day
cryptography. They form an important building block in
the construction of larger protocols in, for example, gam-
bling and electronic voting, and other instances of secure
two-party computation. In the realm of quantum me-
chanics, it has been shown that oblivious transfer [1] can
be achieved provided there exists a secure bit commit-
ment scheme [2, 3]. In turn, classical oblivious transfer
can be used to perform any secure two-party computa-
tion [4]. Commitments are also useful for constructing
zero-knowledge proofs [5] and lead to coin tossing [6].
Classically, unconditionally secure non-relativistic bit
commitment is known to be impossible. Unfortunately,
after several quantum schemes were suggested [7], non-
relativistic quantum bit commitment was shown to be
impossible, too [8, 9], even in the presence of supers-
election rules [10]. In fact, only very limited degrees of
concealment and bindingness can be obtained [11]. It has
been shown that the quantum no-go theorems do not ap-
ply to protocols which use two or more sites and take
account of relativistic signaling constraints. We work in
the non-relativistic quantum mechanical setting, hence
all presented results are referring to this setting only. In
the face of the negative results regarding this setting,
what can we still hope to achieve?
In this letter, we consider the task of committing to a
string of n bits at once when both the honest player and
the adversary have unbounded resources. Since perfect
bit commitment is impossible, perfect bit string commit-
ment is impossible, too. We thus give both Alice and Bob
a limited ability to cheat. First, we introduce a frame-
work for the classification of bit string commitments in
terms of the length n of the string, Alice’s ability to cheat
on at most a bits and Bob’s ability to acquire at most b
bits of information before the reveal phase. We say that
Alice can cheat on a bits if she can reveal up to 2a strings
successfully. Bob’s security definition is crucial to our in-
vestigation: If b determines a bound on his probability to
guess Alice’s string, then we prove that a+b is at least n.
This implies that the trivial protocol, where Alice’s com-
mitment consists of sending b bits of her string to Bob,
is optimal. If, however, b is a bound on the accessible in-
formation that the quantum states contain about Alice’s
string, then we show that non-trivial schemes exist. More
precisely, we construct schemes with a = 4 log2 n+O(1)
and b = 4. This is impossible classically.
Quantum commitments of strings have previously
been considered by Kent [12], who pointed out that
in the quantum world useful bit string commitments
could be possible despite the no-go theorem for bit
commitment. His scenario differs significantly from
ours and imposes an additional constraint, which is
not present in our work: Alice does not commit to a
superposition of strings.
Framework.
Definition 1 An (n, a, b)-Quantum Bit String Commit-
2ment (QBSC) is a quantum communication protocol be-
tween two parties, Alice (the committer) and Bob (the
receiver), which consists of two phases and two security
requirements.
• (Commit Phase) Assume that both parties are hon-
est. Alice chooses a string x ∈ {0, 1}n with prob-
ability px. Alice and Bob communicate and at the
end Bob holds state ρx.
• (Reveal Phase) If both parties are honest, Alice and
Bob communicate and at the end Bob learns x. Bob
accepts.
• (Concealing) If Alice is honest, ∑x∈{0,1}n pBx|x ≤
2b, where pBx|x is the probability that Bob correctly
guesses x before the reveal phase given ρx.
• (Binding) If Bob is honest, then for all commit-
ments of Alice:
∑
x∈{0,1}n p
A
x ≤ 2a, where pAx is the
probability that Alice successfully reveals x.
We say that Alice successfully reveals a string x if Bob
accepts the opening of x, i.e. he performs a test depend-
ing on the individual protocol to check Alice’s honesty
and concludes that she was indeed honest. Note that
quantumly, Alice can always commit to a superposition
of different strings without being detected. Thus even for
a perfectly binding bit string commitment (i.e. a = 0) we
only demand that
∑
x∈{0,1}n p
A
x ≤ 1, whereas classically
one wants that pAx′ = δx,x′ . Note that our concealing
definition reflects Bob’s a priori knowledge about x. We
choose an a priori uniform distribution (i.e. px = 2
−n)
for (n, a, b)-QBSCs, which naturally comes from the fact
that we consider n-bit strings. A generalization to any
(PX , a, b)-QBSC where PX is an arbitrary distribution
is possible but omitted in order not to obscure our main
line of argument. Instead of Bob’s guessing probability,
one can take any information measure B to express
the security against Bob. In general, we consider an
(n, a, b)-QBSCB where the new Concealing-condition
reads B(E) ≤ b with ensemble E = {px, ρx}. In the latter
part of this letter we show that for B being the accessible
information non-trivial protocols, i.e. protocols with
a + b ≪ n, exist. The accessible information is defined
as Iacc(E) = maxM I(X ;Y ), where PX is the prior
distribution of the random variable X , Y is the random
variable of the outcome of Bob’s measurement on E , and
the maximization is taken over all measurements M .
Impossibility. Our impossibility result will be proven in
three steps: we first show that any (n, a, b)-QBSC is
also an (n, a, b)-QBSCξ with the security measure ξ(E)
defined below in eq. (1). Secondly, we prove that an
(n, a, b)-QBSCξ can only exist for values a, b and n obey-
ing a+b+c ≥ n, where c is a small constant independent
of a, b and n. This in turn implies the impossibility of
an (n, a, b)-QBSC for such parameters. Finally, we show
that many executions of the protocol can only be secure
if a+b ≥ n. Before we proceed to the proof, we introduce
a few tools from quantum information theory.
We work in the model of two-party non-relativistic
quantum protocols of Yao [3], simplified by Lo and
Chau [8] which is usually adopted in this context. Here,
any two-party quantum protocol can be regarded as a
pair of quantum machines (Alice and Bob), interacting
through a quantum channel. Consider the product of
three Hilbert spaces HA, HB and HC of bounded di-
mensions representing the Hilbert spaces of Alice’s and
Bob’s machines and the channel, respectively. Without
loss of generality, we assume that each machine is ini-
tially in a specified pure state. Alice and Bob perform
a number of rounds of communication over the channel.
Each such round can be modeled as a unitary transfor-
mation on HA ⊗ HC and HB ⊗ HC respectively. Since
the protocol is known to both Alice and Bob, they know
the set of possible unitary transformations used in the
protocol. We assume that Alice and Bob are in posses-
sion of both a quantum computer and a quantum storage
device. This enables them to add ancillae to the quan-
tum machine and use reversible unitary operations to
replace measurements. By doing so, Alice and Bob can
delay measurements and thus we can limit ourselves to
protocols where both parties only measure at the very
end. Moreover, any classical computation or communi-
cation that may occur can be simulated by a quantum
computer.
We now show that every (n, a, b)-QBSC is an (n, a, b)-
QBSCξ. The security measure ξ(E) is defined by
ξ(E) ≡ n−H2(ρAB |ρ), (1)
where ρAB =
∑
x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx and ρ =
∑
x pxρx are
only dependent on the ensemble E = {px, ρx}. H2(·|·)
is an entropic quantity defined in [13] H2(ρ
AB|ρ) ≡
− logTr((I ⊗ ρ− 12 )ρAB)2. This quantity is directly con-
nected to Bob’s maximal average probability of successful
guessing the string:
Lemma 1 Bob’s maximal average probability of
successfully guessing the committed string, i.e.
supM
∑
x pxp
B,M
x|x where M ranges over all mea-
surements and pB,My|x is the conditional probability of
guessing y given ρx, is larger or equal to 2
−H2(ρAB |ρ).
Proof: By definition the maximum average guessing
probability is lower bounded by the average guessing
probability for a particular measurement strategy. We
choose the square-root measurement which has operators
Mx = pxρ
− 1
2 ρxρ
− 1
2 . pBx|x = Tr(Mxρx) is the probability
3that Bob guesses x given ρx, hence
log2
∑
x
pxp
B,max
x|x ≥ log2
∑
x
p2xTr(ρ
− 1
2 ρxρ
− 1
2 ρx)
= log2Tr
([
(I⊗ ρ− 12 )ρAB
]2)
= −H2(ρAB|ρ). ✷
Related estimates were derived in [14]. For the uniform
distribution px = 2
−n we have from the concealing con-
dition that
∑
x p
B
x|x ≤ 2b which by Lemma 1 implies
ξ(E) ≤ b. Thus, every (n, a, b)-QBSC is an (n, a, b)-
QBSCξ.
We make use of the following theorem, known as pri-
vacy amplification against a quantum adversary. In our
case, Bob holds the quantum memory and privacy am-
plification is used to find Alice’s attack.
Theorem 1 (Th. 5.5.1 in [13] (see also [15]))
Let G be a class of two-universal hash functions [25]
from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}s. Application of g ∈ G to the
random variable X maps the ensemble E = {px, ρx} to
Eg = {qgy , σgy} with probabilities qgy =
∑
x∈g−1(y) px and
quantum states σgy =
∑
x∈g−1(y) pxρx. Then
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
d(Eg) ≤ 1
2
2−
1
2
[H2(ρAB |ρ)−s], (2)
where d(E) ≡ δ(∑x px|x〉〈x|⊗ρx, I/2n⊗ρ) (and similarly
for d(Eg)) and δ(α, β) ≡ 12Tr|α− β|.
The following reasoning is used to prove the impossi-
bility of quantum bit commitment [8, 9]: Suppose ρ0 and
ρ1 are density operators that correspond to a commit-
ment of a “0” or a “1” respectively. Let |φ0〉 and |φ1〉
be the corresponding purifications on the joint system of
Alice and Bob. If ρ0 equals ρ1 then Alice can find a lo-
cal unitary transformation U that Alice can apply to her
part of the system such that |φ1〉 = U ⊗ I|φ0〉. This en-
ables Alice to change the total state from |φ0〉 to |φ1〉 and
thus cheat. This reasoning also holds in an approximate
sense [9], here used in the following form [26]:
Lemma 2 Let δ(ρ0, ρ1) ≤ ǫ and assume that the bit-
commitment protocol is error-free if both parties are hon-
est. Then there is a method for Alice to cheat such that
the probability of successfully revealing a 0 given that she
committed to a 1 is greater or equal to 1−√2ǫ.
Now, we can prove our impossibility result.
Theorem 2 (n, a, b)-QBSCξ schemes, and thus also
(n, a, b)-QBSC schemes, with a + b + c < n do not ex-
ist. c is a constant equal to 5 log2 5− 4 ≈ 7.61.
Proof: Consider an (n, a, b)-QBSCξ and the case where
both Alice and Bob are honest. Alice committed to
x. We denote the joint state of the system Alice-Bob-
Channel HA⊗HB ⊗HC after the commit phase by |φx〉
for input state |x〉. Let ρx be Bob’s reduced density ma-
trix, and let E = {px, ρx} where px = 2−n.
Assuming that Bob is honest, we will give a cheating
strategy for Alice in the case where a+b+5 log2 5−4 < n.
The strategy will depend on the two-universal hash func-
tion g : X = {0, 1}n → Y = {0, 1}n−m, for appropri-
ately chosen m. Alice picks a y ∈ Y and constructs the
state (
∑
x∈g−1(y) |x〉|x〉)/
√
|g−1(y)|. She then gives the
second half of this state as input to the protocol and
stays honest for the rest of the commit phase. The joint
state of Alice and Bob at the end of the commit phase
is thus |ψgy〉 = (
∑
x∈g−1(y) |x〉|φx〉)/
√
|g−1(y)|. The re-
duced states on Bob’s side are σgy =
1
qgy
∑
x∈g−1(y) pxρx
with probability qgy =
∑
x∈g−1(y) px. We denote this en-
semble by Eg. Let σ = σg =
∑
y q
g
yσ
g
y for all g.
We now apply Theorem 1 with s = n−m and ξ(E) ≤ b
and obtain 1|G|
∑
g∈G d(Eg) ≤ ε where ε = 122−
1
2
(m−b).
Hence, there is at least one g such that d(Eg) ≤ ε; intu-
itively, this means that Bob knows only very little about
the value of g(x). This g defines Alice’s cheating strategy.
It is straightforward to verify that d(Eg) ≤ ε implies
2−(n−m)
∑
y
δ(σ, σgy) ≤ 2ε. (3)
Let us therefore assume without loss of generality that
Alice chooses y0 ∈ Y with δ(σgy0 , σ) ≤ 2ε.
Clearly, the probability to successfully reveal some x
in g−1(y) given |ψgy〉 is one [27]. Thus the probability to
reveal y (i.e. to reveal an x such that y = g(x)) given |ψgy〉
successfully is one. Let p˜x and q˜
g
y denote the probabilities
to successfully reveal x and y respectively and p˜gx|y be the
conditional probability to successfully reveal x, given y.
We have
∑
x p˜x =
∑
y q˜
g
y
∑
x∈g−1(y) p˜
g
x|y ≥
∑
y q˜
g
y .
Recall that Alice can transform |ψgy0〉 approximately
into |ψgy〉 if σgy0 is sufficiently close to σgy by using only lo-
cal transformations on her part. It follows from Lemma 2
that we can estimate the probability of revealing y, given
that the state was really |ψy0〉. Since this reasoning ap-
plies to all y, on average, we have∑
y
q˜gy ≥
∑
y
(1 − 2 12 δ(σgy0 , σgy)
1
2 )
≥ 2n−m − 2 12 2n−m(2m−n∑
y
δ(σgy0 , σ
g
y)
) 1
2
≥ 2n−m[1− 2 12 (2m−n(
∑
y
δ(σgy0 , σ) + δ(σ, σ
g
y)))
1
2 ]
≥ 2n−m(1− 2(2ε) 12 ),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 2, the sec-
ond from Jensen’s inequality and the concavity of the
square root function, the third from the triangle inequal-
ity and the fourth from eq. (3) and δ(σgy0 , σ) ≤ 2ε. Re-
call that to be secure against Alice, we require 2a ≥
42n−m(1 − 2(2ε) 12 ). We insert ǫ = 122−
1
2
(m−b), define
m = b+ γ and take the logarithm on both sides to get
a+ b + δ ≥ n, (4)
where δ = γ − log(1 − 2−γ/4+1). Keeping in mind that
1 − 2−γ/4+1 > 0 (or equivalently γ > 4), we find that
the minimum value of δ for which eq. (4) is satisfied is
δ = 5 log2 5− 4 and arises from γ = 4(log2 5− 1). Thus,
no (n, a, b)-QBSCξ with a+ b+5 log2 5− 4 < n exists. ✷
Since the constant c does not depend on a, b and n,
multiple parallel executions of the protocol can only be
secure if a+ b ≥ n:
Corollary 1 Let P be an (n, a, b)-QBSC with Pm an
(mn,ma,mb)-QBSC. Then n < a + b + c/m. In par-
ticular, no (n, a, b)-QBSC with a+ b < n can be executed
securely an arbitrary number of times in parallel. The
latter statement also applies to (n, a, b)−QBSCχs, where
χ denotes the Holevo information of the ensemble E [17].
It follows directly from [10] that the results in this
section also hold in the presence of superselection rules.
Possibility. Surprisingly, if one is willing to measure
Bob’s ability to learn x using the accessible information
non-trivial protocols become possible. These protocols
are based on a discovery known as “locking of classical
information in quantum states” [18]. The protocol, which
we call LOCKCOM(n, U), uses this effect and is specified
by a set U = {U1, . . . , U|U|} of unitaries.
• Commit phase: Alice has the string x ∈ {0, 1}n and
randomly chooses r ∈ {1, . . . , |U|}. She sends the
state Ur|x〉 to Bob, where Ur ∈ U .
• Reveal phase: Alice announces r and x. Bob ap-
plies U †r and measures in the computational basis
to obtain x′. He accepts if and only if x′ = x.
As a first observation, the number of unitaries |U| limits
the number of different ways of revealing a string, i.e.
2a ≤ |U| [28]. Furthermore we have adapted the work
in [19] in order to show that there exist O(n4) unitaries
that bring Bob’s accessible information down to a con-
stant: Iacc(E) ≤ 4 [17, Appendix B.2]. In summary:
Theorem 3 For n ≥ 3, there exist (n, 4 log2 n+O(1), 4)-
QBSCIacc protocols.
The protocol is as follows: Alice chooses a set of O(n4)
unitaries independently according to the Haar measure
(approximated) and announces the resulting set U to
Bob. They then perform LOCKCOM(n,U). Our anal-
ysis shows that this variant is secure against Bob with
high probability. Unfortunately, the protocol is ineffi-
cient both in terms of computation and communication.
It remains open to find an efficient constructive scheme
with those parameters.
In contrast, for only two bases, an efficient construc-
tion exists and uses the identity and the Hadamard trans-
form as unitaries. From [18] (see also [20]) it then fol-
lows that LOCKCOM(n, {I⊗n, H⊗n}) is an (n, 1, n/2)-
QBSCIacc protocol. As shown in [21], this protocol can
be made cheat sensitive [22] for Bob, i.e. any nonzero
information-gain by Bob will be detected by Alice with
nonzero probability.
A drawback of weakening the security requirement is
that LOCKCOM protocols are not necessarily compos-
able. Therefore, if LOCKCOM is used as a sub-protocol
in a larger protocol, the security of the resulting scheme
has to be evaluated on a case by case basis. However,
LOCKCOM protocols are secure when executed in par-
allel. This is a consequence of the definition of Alice’s
security parameter and the additivity of the accessible
information [23], and sufficient for many cryptographic
purposes.
Conclusion We have introduced a framework for quan-
tum commitments to a string of bits and shown that
under strong security requirements (e.g. bounded guess-
ing probability or Holevo information), non-trivial pro-
tocols do not exist. A property of quantum states known
as locking, however, allowed us to propose meaningful
protocols for a weaker security demand: Alice encodes
her classical n bit string into a quantum state in such a
way that no measurement on Bob’s side will yield high
mutual information with the commitment. Alice is gen-
uinely committed, because the quantum states that she
sent contain almost the complete commitment, i.e. have
high Holevo information.
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